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Abstract. In social science, one objection to causal analysis is that the assumption of the 
closure of the system makes it too narrow in scope, that is it only considers ‘closed’ and 
‘hermetic’ systems thus neglecting many other external influences. On the contrary, 
system analysis deals with complex structures where every element is interrelated with 
everything else in the system. The question arises as to whether the two approaches can be 
compatible and whether causal analysis can be integrated into the broader framework of 
system analysis. This paper attempts a negative answer on the grounds of fundamental 
differences in their assumptions and suggests using system analysis as a post hoc 
comparative tool. 
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1. Descriptivist, causalist, and systemic approaches  
The social sciences study societies and humans from different angles and 
perspectives. Think of economics, that studies the management of goods and 
services, or of demography, that studies variations in the population characteristics 
due to mortality, fertility and migration, or of epidemiology (half way between 
demography and medicine), that is interested in the distribution of disease within a 
population or across populations. Broadly speaking, two main approaches might 
be distinguished. Some social scientists are descriptivist, whilst others are overtly 
causalist. The former are interested in giving the best possible picture of a given 
social phenomenon, without, for a whole range of different reasons, daring any 
causal interpretation. The latter, conversely, take causal attribution and causal 
explanation to be an essential element for understanding, predicting and 
intervening on society. To be sure, there is a third approach. This is systemics. 
Systemics, or system analysis, takes it as a starting point that reality, at any level, is 
organised into systems, and that in a system every element is interrelated to 
everything else. In the social sciences, the goal will be to analyse social systems 
according to the principles of a general system theory. 
Reconciling descriptivists and causalists seems to be a difficult task albeit not 
impossible. As a causalist, I should simultaneously work on two fronts: on the one 
side, to convince descriptivists that they do need causality (although, of course, 
mere descriptive knowledge is essential in a first exploratory stage), and on the 
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other side, to improve causal methods and their foundations. Reconciling 
causalists and system theorists is also a hard and complex task. Here, I’ll take up 
this second challenge. 
The paper is organised as follows. I present causal analysis and system analysis 
in section 2 and 3, respectively. Attention is paid to their specific assumptions and 
to their methodology. I then try to show that the comparison of the two 
approaches poses a dilemma. If we take system analysis seriously, the two 
approaches clash too much to be compatible. If we do not, the two approaches are 
not so different, after all. Section 4 considers the first horn of the dilemma. I argue 
that causal and system analysis differ too much in their fundamental assumptions 
and methodology to be complementary, and that system analysis fails as an 
analytical tool. Finally, the last section considers the second horn and explores the 
possible role of system analysis as a post hoc comparative tool. 
2. Causal analysis 
Different types of causal models and of goals 
Causal analysis is concerned with identifying causes and effects of social 
phenomena with the purpose of understanding, predicting and eventually 
intervening on society and on individuals. Thus, on the one hand causal analysis 
engages with a cognitive goal—this relates to explanation—and on the other hand 
it engages with a an action-oriented goal—this relates to inference and decision. 
Typically, two types of causal analysis are distinguished: qualitative and 
quantitative. Qualitative analysis is performed by methods such as interviews or 
direct participation into settings. Unlike qualitative analysis, quantitative analysis 
takes advantage of the statistical machinery developed in the pioneering works of 
Wright in the 1920s, which grew in complexity and sophistication thanks to the 
work, to mention just a few, of Blalock and Duncan in the 1960s and 1970s, and 
more recently, since the 1980s, of Pearl and of Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines. 
Statistical models used for causal analysis are customarily called, ‘causal models’, at 
least since the 1960s. In spite of this apparent difference, the two types of causal 
analysis arguably share the same goals. However, to make the case for this claim 
would be the object of another paper, so here I shall confine the discussion to 
quantitative causal analysis in the social sciences. Quantitative causal models can 
also be of different types. Some aim to measure effects of causes (e.g., Rubin’s 
potential outcome model), while others aim to disentangle causal mechanisms 
(e.g., structural equation and path models). Some aim to infer causal relations 
inductively from data, while others aim to confirm a hypothesised causal structure. 
In the following, I shall mainly consider causal models that aim to disentangle 
causal mechanisms using a hypothetico-deductive methodology, and shall focus on 
their goals, assumptions, and methodology. 
Quantitative causal analysis 
A causal model typically consists of a set of mathematical equations and/or of a 
graph laying down the hypothesised causal structure pictorially. More technical and 
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precise definitions of causal model are of course possible. See for instance Wunsch 
(1988) and Freedman (2005) for an accessible introduction to causal modelling and 
statistics, Mouchart et al. (2008) and Russo (2008) for a critical evaluation of them. 
For the purpose of the present paper we can keep technicalities to a minimum. 
Typically, both equations and graphs are employed. However, one can start by 
writing the equations and subsequently drawing the graph or the other way round. 
Causal models normally consist of sets of equations, indicating a web of causal and 
non-causal relations among the variables of interest.  
Causal models also rest on a number of assumptions, falling into three groups: 
statistical, extra-statistical, and causal. Among the statistical assumptions we find, 
for instance, linearity, normality, and non-measurement error. Those are standard 
statistical assumptions also made in associational models. However, causal models 
are provided with a much richer apparatus that allows their causal interpretation. 
In this apparatus we find background knowledge, the conceptual hypothesis, a 
number of extra-statistical assumptions and of causal assumptions. Among extra-
statistical assumptions we can list the direction of time, causal asymmetry, causal 
priority, causal ordering. Causal assumptions include: no-confounding, non-
correlation of error terms, stability, and invariance. For a detailed account of the 
statistical, extra-statistical, and causal assumptions in causal models, see Russo 
(2008, ch.3-4). In the following, I shall focus on the assumption of the closure of 
the system and on the hypothetico-deductive methodology as they are most 
relevant for the comparison with system analysis. 
The closure of the system 
A major assumption of causal analysis is the so-called assumption of closure of the 
system. This assumption says that the system under analysis is not subject to 
external influences and thus can be separated, so to speak, from the larger web of 
interrelations in which it is located. Thanks to this assumption we can, at least in 
principle, detect the causes acting in the mechanism under investigation. As we 
shall see later in section 4, in this assumption lies the bulk of the divergence 
between system analysis and causal analysis.  
To be sure, two variants of the closure ought to be distinguished: strong and 
weak. Strong closure assumes that there is no influence at all in any of the variables 
figuring in the model, neither in the causes, nor in the effects. Pictorially: 
 
 
FIG. 1 Strong closure 
 
X Y 
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This assumption, however, is too strong and is normally relaxed in favour of 
weak closure: variables in the model undergo influences from non-observed 
variables non correlated between themselves. 
Pictorially:
 
FIG. 2 Weak closure 
 
Closure fails when non-observed variables influencing the variables in the model 
are instead correlated between themselves thus leading to a situation of 
confounding and making it impossible to estimate correctly the (causal) relation 
between the cause(s) and the effect. 
The assumption of the closure is obviously related to covariate sufficiency and 
no-confounding. Simply put, covariate sufficiency says that the model includes all 
the variables needed in order to account for the phenomenon under investigation. 
Conversely, no-confounding says that variables liable to confound the relation 
between the ‘true’ cause(s) and the effect have been controlled for. Thus, if we put 
those three pieces of the puzzle together—(weak) closure, covariate sufficiency, 
and no-confounding—we end up with a causal model that describes a (quasi) 
hermetic mechanism where all and only the relevant variables play a role. 
Hypothetico-deductivism 
Causal models, at least those I’m concerned with in this paper,1 employ a 
hypothetico-deductive methodology. Simply put, hypothetico-deductivism is the 
view according to which scientists first formulate hypotheses and then test them 
by seeing whether or not the consequences derived from the hypotheses obtain. 
Popper (1959), who developed the H-D methodology, was motivated by the need 
of creating a scientific method in a non-inductive way. However, in causal analysis, 
hypothetico-deductivism takes a slightly different facet specifically concerning 
deduction, but does borrow from the Popperian account the primary role of the 
hypothesis-formulation stage. I shall get back to this point shortly.  
                                                     
1 As mentioned above, causal models can also be used in an inductive way, e.g. data mining. This is, 
for instance, the approach of Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines (1993), and, to some extent, of Pearl 
(2000). Inductivist approaches claim that causal relations can be inferred from data without the 
burden of extra-statistical and causal assumptions made in their hypothetico-deductive 
counterparts. However, it goes far beyond the goal of this paper to discuss the success of inductive 
causal models. Consequently, the scope will be limited to causal models that employ a hypothetico-
deductive methodology. 
X Y 
S T 
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According to the H-D methodology, model building and model testing 
essentially involve three stages: 
1. formulate the causal hypothesis; 
2. build the statistical model; 
3. draw consequences to conclude to the empirical validity or invalidity of the 
causal hypothesis. 
The hypothesis to put forward for empirical testing does not come from a 
tabula rasa, but emerges from a causal context, namely from background 
knowledge, that is knowledge concerning the phenomenon at stake, previously 
established theories, and preliminary analyses of data. The causal hypothesis, that 
states a hypothesised causal mechanism, is also called the ‘conceptual hypothesis’ 
and is not analysable a priori. That is to say, its validity is not testable by a logico-
linguistic analysis of concepts involved therein. On the contrary, to test the validity 
of the causal hypothesis requires building a statistical model, and then drawing 
consequences from the hypothesis in order to test the hypothesis against empirical 
data. 
The estimation of the statistical model and hypothesis testing will allow us to 
conclude to the empirical validity or invalidity of the causal hypothesis. If the 
model is correctly estimated and fits the data, and if certain conditions are satisfied 
(notably, exogeneity and invariance) the hypothesised causal link is accepted, 
rejected otherwise. The hypothetico-deductive structure of causal modelling is thus 
apparent: a causal mechanism is first hypothesised and then put forward for 
empirical testing. That it to say, the causal hypothesis is not directly inferred from the 
data gathered, as is the case with inductive strategies, but accepted or rejected 
depending on the results of tests and on background knowledge.  
As anticipated above, hypothetico-deductivism in causal modelling does not 
involve deduction structu sensu, but involves a weaker inferential step of ‘drawing 
consequences’ from the hypothesis. Once the causal hypothesis is formulated out 
of the observation of meaningful co-variations between the putative cause(s) and 
the putative effect and out of background knowledge, we do not require data to be 
implied by the hypothesis but just that data conform to it. Here, ‘conform’ means 
that the selected indicators and relations among them adequately represent the 
conceptual variables appearing in the causal hypothesis and the relations among 
them. Thus, this way of validating the causal hypothesis is not, strictly speaking, a 
matter of deduction, but surely is, broadly speaking, a deductive procedure. More 
precisely, it is a hypothetico-deductive procedure insofar as it goes the opposite 
direction of inductive methodologies: not from rough data to theory, but from 
theories to data. For a discussion of the H-D methodology, see also Little (1998, 
ch.9), Cartwright (2007, ch. 2) and Russo (2008, ch. 3).  
Modelling mechanisms 
I just said that hypothetico-deductive causal models aim to (dis)confirm a causal 
hypothesis, and only hurriedly mentioned that the causal hypothesis is about a 
causal mechanism. Let me develop this idea a bit further.  
What do causal models do? Causal models model the properties of a social 
system. In particular, they model the relations between the properties or 
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characteristics of the system, which are represented by variables. By ‘social system’ 
I simply mean, for the time being, a given population. ‘Population’, in turn, has to 
be understood here in the statistical sense, that is as a set of units, those units 
being individuals, households, firms, etc.  
To model the properties of a social system means to give the scheme, or the 
skeleton, of how these properties relate to each other. However, this causal 
mechanism is not modelled in terms of spatio-temporal processes and interactions 
à la Salmon (1984 and 1990) but is statistically modelled. Concepts typical of 
statistical causality—e.g., statistical relevance, comparison of conditional 
probabilities, and screening-off—are used in order to identify the types of 
relationships that hold among the variables of interest. This is how the causal 
model models the causal mechanism governing the social system. In particular, 
causal models seek to uncover stable variational relations between the 
characteristics of the system. For one account of the notion of variation and of 
mechanism in causal modelling, see Russo (2008, ch.6). For the present discussion, 
we need to keep in mind the following points: (i) mechanisms can be conceived of 
as schemes of how variables relate to each other; (ii) in a mechanism, variables play 
specific (causal) roles, e.g. direct, indirect, or intermediate causes; (iii) some types 
of relations in causal mechanisms are excluded, e.g. instantaneous feedback loops2. 
3. System analysis 
Scope and goals of system analysis 
Under the label ‘system analysis’, or ‘systemics’, or ‘systemism’, falls the general 
approach to systems presented in the works of e.g. von Bertalanffy (1968), Simon 
(1969), and Bunge (1979).  
The systemic viewpoint becomes necessary, system theorists say, for a number 
of reasons. For instance, various scientific disciplines encountered difficulties 
espousing causalist and/or positivistic approaches. But mostly, as systems are 
ubiquitous and arguably systems are exactly the kind of thing they study, a general 
framework is needed. 
More specifically, a general system theory is, according to von Bertalanffy, a theory 
the subject matter of which is the formulation and derivation of those principles 
which are valid for systems in general. In the Preface, von Bertalanffy defines 
system science the scientific exploration and theory of system in the various sciences. 
He indicates the major aims of general system theory thus (von Bertalanffy 1968, 
p. 37):  
This indicates major aims of a general system theory: 
1. there is a general tendency towards the interpretation in the various 
sciences, natural and social; 
2. such interpretation seems to be centred in a general system theory; 
3. such theory may be an important means of aiming at exact theory in the 
non-physical fields of science; 
                                                     
2 Feedback loops that are ordered in time are admissible: Xt causing Yt’ which in turn causes Xt’’ but 
at a later time. 
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4. developing unifying principles running ‘vertically’ through the universe of 
the individual sciences; 
5. this can lead to a much-needed integration in scientific education. 
In the same vein, Bunge (1979) conceives of system analysis as a set of theories 
that focus on the structural characteristics of systems. Therefore systemism aims 
to cross the largely artificial barriers between different disciplines. Thus Bunge 
qualifies system theory as having two characteristic traits: (i) there are some 
concepts and structural principles that seem to hold for systems of many kinds, 
and (ii) there are modelling strategies that seem to work everywhere. Furthermore, 
according to Bunge, systemics has two main motivations: cognitive and practical. 
The cognitive motivation is the wish to discover similarities among systems of all 
kind despite the different contexts in which they arise and operate. The practical 
motivation amounts to the need to cope with the huge and many-sided system 
characteristic of industrial society. 
Systems and the whole 
What is a system, then? Informally, a system is a set of elements standing in 
reciprocal interrelation. Somewhat more formally, as von Bertalanffy (1968, p. 37) 
states:  
Elements, p, stand in relation, R, so that the behaviour of an element p in R  is 
different from its behaviour in another relation, R’. If the behaviours in R and R’ are 
not different, there is no interaction, and the elements behave independently with 
respect to the relations R and R’. 
This is still a qualitative characterisation of what a system is. Systems are 
mathematically defined by certain families of differential equations, and properties of 
those systems are found as long as more specific conditions are introduced. I 
won’t linger on the mathematical technicalities of the definition of system, for 
which I direct the reader to von Bertalanffy (1968, ch. 3) and Bunge (1979, ch. 1). 
It will be worth distinguishing, from the very beginning, between aggregates 
and systems. Unlike systems, aggregates are just collections of items not held 
together by bonds and therefore lacking any integrity or unity (see Bunge 1979, p. 
4). However, both systems and aggregates can be either concrete or conceptual. 
An example of conceptual system is a scientific theory and an example of concrete 
system is a school. 
It is worth noting that Bunge (1979, p. 2) also draws a distinction between 
systemics and system analysis. System analysis studies many-sides and multi-level 
systems and for doing so it must adopt various points of view on different levels. 
However, unlike systemics, system analysis is not particularly interested in de-
emphasising the peculiarities of the components of the system to the benefit of the 
interrelations that hold in it. Nevertheless, other authors, including von 
Bertalanffy, use the two terms as synonyms meaning the precise sense of 
‘systemics’. A corollary of this distinction is that Bunge would possibly locate 
multilevel or hierarchical models, a particular class of quantitative causal models, 
within system analysis but not necessarily in systemics. In other words, the 
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recognition of a multi-sided and multi-level organisation of reality is not sufficient 
for systemics. 
Systemics is the science of the whole. Traditionally, the science of the whole 
comes in two variants, namely holism and atomism. In a nutshell, holism is the 
ontological view that stresses the integrity of systems at the expenses of their 
components and of the mutual actions among them. On the other hand, atomism 
is the view that the whole is contained in its parts, so that the study of the latter 
should suffice for understanding the former. However, Bunge contends that these 
two doctrines be capable of properly analysing systems (Bunge 1979, p. 39ff). 
Instead, what makes systemics a successful tool for the science of the whole is its 
proper methodology:  
1. the identification of the components of the system,  
2. the identification of the environment, and  
3. the identification of the structure.  
Indeed, in a systemic perspective, it makes little or no sense at all to hypothesise 
any relations without knowing what the relata may be. This, it goes without saying, 
is in sharp contraposition with the H-D methodology of causal modelling. But I 
shall get back to this point in section 4. 
Systemics: a different worldview 
The starting point of the systemic approach is that the world shows a systemic 
organisation, that is systems, as said above, are ubiquitous—living beings organise 
themselves in systems at the biological as well societal level. Thus, the concept of 
system becomes omnipresent in virtually all scientific domains. This, as a simple 
recognition about the world would be rather innocuous—yet true—if it were not 
accompanied by a much stronger assumption that in a system every thing is 
interrelated with everything else.  
In fact von Bertalanffy (1968, p. 16), in Kuhnian terms, thinks that system 
analysis opens altogether a new paradigm.  Various systemic approaches may be 
logically inhomogeneous and represent different conceptual models, mathematical 
techniques or point of views; nonetheless they have a common denominator in 
being system theories. This common denominator is constituted by the specific 
concept of system thereby developed.  
 Let me now draw the reader’s attention to the most controversial foundational 
aspects of systemics. A philosopher would call them the philosophical foundations, a 
scientists may content herself with worldview. Either way, these are the assumptions 
at the very basis of the general system theory and without them it does not make 
any sense to call an analysis systemic.  
von Bertalanffy (1968, p. xvi) explicitly talks about a system philosophy. This is a 
reorientation of thought and worldview ensuing from the introduction of ‘system’ 
as a new scientific paradigm. In particular, this turn goes against the traditional 
analytic, mechanistic and one-way causal paradigms of classical science. 
Unfortunately, very little space is devoted in his book to the discussion of the 
system ontology and epistemology and to the comparison with the (positivist) 
philosophy that underlies classical science. A main issue with system ontology is 
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the nature of systems. Some systems are real (e.g., a galaxy, an atom), others are 
conceptual (e.g., maths and logic systems), and others are abstract (e.g., scientific 
models). But those distinctions are not as clear-cut. A social or ecological system, 
for instance, is real and yet it is not the object of direct observation and perception 
by an observer or agent. The commonsense distinction between what is ‘real’ and 
what is ‘conceptual’ thus lacks a meaningful counterpart in systemics—the issue, as 
von Bertalanffy acknowledges, deserves further investigation and clarification. 
System epistemology also breaks down a pillar of the ‘received’ (and 
commonsense) epistemology, namely the distinction between the object of 
knowledge and the knowing subject. As von Bertalanffy says (1968, p. xx):  
Perception is not a reflection of ‘real things’ (whatever their metaphysical status), and 
knowledge is not a simple approximation to ‘truth’ or ‘reality’. It is an interaction 
between knower and known, this dependent on a multiplicity of factors of a 
biological, psychological, cultural, linguistic, etc., nature. 
 However, the most relevant philosophical shift is the following (von Bertalanffy 1968, p. 
xxi): 
The third part of systems philosophy will be concerned with the relations of man 
and world or what is termed ‘values’ in philosophical parlance. If reality is a hierarchy 
of organized wholes, the image of man will be different from what it is in a world of 
physical particles governed by chance events as ultimate and only ‘true’ reality. 
Rather, the world of symbols, values, social entities ad cultures is something very 
‘real’; and its embeddedness in a cosmic order of hierarchies is apt to bridge the 
opposition of C. P. Snow’s ‘Two Cultures’ of science and the humanities, 
technologies and history, natural and social sciences, or in whatever way the 
antithesis is formulated. 
von Bertalanffy is denying the distinction between knower and known. The 
knowing agent belongs to the system, she interacts with it, and therefore changes it 
in the process of knowing it. von Bertalanffy aims to bridge Snow’s ‘Two cultures’, 
thus contributing to the increasing constructivist worldview in the humanities and 
extending it to science by claiming scientific method to be embedded into language 
and culture and therefore lacking objectivity. On the contrary, classical science 
claims that the observer can still have a grip on reality by making objective and 
non-culturally embedded statements about the world. 
Bunge also devotes a chapter to the ‘systemic worldview’, as he calls it. To 
begin with, Bunge (1979, p. 245) warns us not to confuse systemics with the 
‘popular’ system philosophy which is a new version of holism according to which 
everything is a system and the patterns of being and becoming are basically the 
same at all levels. Both these claims, in the general system theory, do not hold. 
Bunge articulates a complex systemic worldview around assumptions, 
postulates, and theorems. How radical is this worldview will become now 
apparent. The first assumption is that there are no stray things. Every thing 
interacts with other things so that all things cohere in forming systems. From 
which, the postulate follows (Bunge 1979, p.  245): every concrete thing is either a 
system or a component of one. Systems, adds Bunge, come into Chinese boxes or 
nested systems. Bunge then states that the following generalisations follow from 
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the assumptions and from the axioms about things and change he developed 
elsewhere (Bunge 1977): 
1. every system is engaged in some process or other; 
2. every change in a system is lawful; 
3. because every subsystem acts upon or is acted on by other subsystems, it 
exists per alium rather than autonomously; 
4. the universe as a whole exists per se and, moreover, it is the only absolute 
(autonomous) existent; 
5. the universe has neither beginning nor end in time: it endures although no 
part of it does. 
For a concise exposition of Bunge’s thought on systemics, see also his (2000). It is not my 
intention to engage with a deep metaphysical discussion about the autonomous existence 
of the universe. The first two generalisations are controversial enough and offer us 
enough matter for a comparison between the systemic and causalist approaches.  
The consequences of such a different perspective on reality are expressed very 
clearly by Mingers (2006), who seeks to apply systemics to the field of business 
and management. He says (Mingers 2006, p. 3): 
If you follow this path [i.e., system methodology] to its logical conclusion then you 
end up in a solipsistic pit from which it is difficult to escape. Every theory becomes 
simply another  viewpoint or Weltanschaung, another interpretation of the world, no 
better no worse than any other. There can be no external social world that enables or 
constraints us, indeed no world at all that is more than a construction of the 
observer. 
This, of course, would make any scientific enterprise impossible, if Mingers did 
not point to the way out, that is critical realism. This view, that he attributes to Roy 
Bhaskar, basically acknowledges the reality of the world and of its objects (i.e., they 
are mind-independent) but at the same time holds that knowledge, especially in the 
social sciences, is always fallible and cultural, spatially and historically relative. 
Later, Mingers (2006, p. 257) claims that system thinking brings to the fore 
issues about epistemology, ontology, methodology, and ethics; those issues, he 
claims, recognise the primary role of the observer in any analysis. Minger accuses 
much academic research to carry on with little attention to those issues and then 
echoes Maturana who believed that “everything said is said by an observer” and 
Churchman who thought that “the system approach begins when you first view 
the world through the eyes of another”. But he also goes on in saying that 
Positivism saw the effacement of the observer as one of the main planks of 
objectivity until Heisenberg demonstrated the inseparability of the observer and 
the observed even in the depth of quantum physics. 
It seems to me that two morals could be drawn out of this. The first is that if 
we take systemics seriously, it altogether entails a radically different perspective on 
reality and on the way we have to make sense of it. This different worldview is in 
sharp contraposition with the metaphysics and epistemology underlying causal 
modelling. The second is that if the whole point is to recognise that knowledge is 
relative, then the question arises as to whether it is absolutely necessary to buy 
systemics with all its metaphysical burden. Moreover, to avoid solipsistic attitudes, 
Minger suggests endorsing a form of critical realism. However, doesn’t this tenet 
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eventually coincide with any other moderate realist stance in science? After all, no 
causal modeller (and perhaps nor any scientist) would claim that she will discover 
eternal and immutable truths. 
Social systems 
Both von Bertalanffy and Bunge present and discuss examples of systems in 
various disciplines, ranging from chemistry to physics, from anthropology to 
sociology. There are various methodological approaches to the study of systems. 
von Bertalanffy mentions, in the preface of his 1968, information theory, 
cybernetics, game theory, decision theory, stochastic models, etc.  
von Bertalanffy acknowledges that these are rather inhomogeneous approaches, 
representing different conceptual models, mathematical techniques and even 
different general points of view; however, they are in accord in being ‘system 
theories’. The extent to which some of the aforementioned approaches are rightly 
put into the systemic approach, I will not thoroughly investigate. Let me just note 
that standard approaches in e.g. decision theory or game theory do not presuppose 
the heavy metaphysics of systemics, namely that every thing is either a system or a 
component of it and that in a system every thing interacts with everything else. So 
it is not clear whether decision and game theorists have been system theorists 
without being aware of, or, after all, systemics does not carry an altogether 
different worldview. But I shall discuss this point more thoroughly in the last 
section. 
von Bertalanffy (1968, ch. 8) considers the case of the social sciences. He 
conceives of them quite broadly as to include sociology, economics, political 
science, but also cultural anthropology or linguistics. The social sciences are, in his 
view, the sciences of systems par excellence. A systemic view in this field goes against 
atomistic conceptions, which neglect the study of relations, and against 
conceptions that neglect the specificity of the systems concerned, such as ‘social 
physics’. It is worth noting that von Bertalanffy does not explicitly mention 
Adolph Quetelet’s social physics. However, the reference to Quetelet seems a 
quite straightforward interpretation as the critical target is a conception that would 
reduce complex social interrelations to deterministic physical ones. 
Bunge (1979, ch. 5) develops systemics in the social sciences in more detail. A 
systemic analysis in the social sciences starts with some assumptions about what 
society is. A human society is, at bottom, an animal society but with novel 
properties; in particular, Bunge says, Man is faber and sapiens, oeconomicus and 
politicus, artifex and ludens. These characteristics will also determine the type of 
relations and activities that take place in human societies. As any other systems, 
human society is defined depending on the following three elements: composition, 
environment, and structure. A human society is composed by humans who share an 
environment and transform it deliberately; they hold social relations and 
communicate among themselves, they are divided into social groups and constitute 
a self-reliant limit. It is worth noting that, according to the systemic view, a factory, 
a school or an army are indeed subsystems of a society but are not societies 
themselves. Societal properties are also formally defined (see Bunge 1979, pp. 190-
191). It will suffice to mention here that two types of properties are distinguished: 
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resultant and emergent. A societal property P of a society σ is a resultant property 
if, and only if, P is also a property of some components of σ, otherwise it is an 
emergent property. For instance, the total food consumption per year is a resultant 
property as it is a mere aggregation of the individual consumptions. Social 
differentiation, participation or cohesion are, instead, emergent societal properties. 
Another characteristic trait of society is that they are composed by various 
interdependent subsystems, in particular the kinship, economic, cultural and 
political. The systemic analysis of social systems aims at describing the structure of 
society and keeping track of its changes. Bunge gives an accurate account of the 
internal systemic dynamics of social subsystems and systems. 
To sum up, system analysis aims at describing the complex structure of systems 
in various scientific domains under two major assumptions: (i) there is no sharp 
distinction between knower and known, and (ii) every thing is interrelated with 
everything else. However, a part from the generic methodological precepts of 
identifying in this order (i) the components, (ii) the environment, and (iii) the 
structure of the system, and of the mathematical description of the system in terms 
of differential equations, we do not find, in system theorists, a more detailed 
explanation of how to perform the analysis of systems, when it comes to analyse 
data sets. 
4. Causal modelling vs. system analysis 
Complementary approaches? 
As mentioned at the end of sec. 1, the comparison of the two approaches seems to 
lead to a dilemma. If we take systemics seriously—in particular, we buy its 
metaphysics—the clash with causal analysis is too big to make them compatible 
with each other. If, instead, we grant system analysis a charitable interpretation, 
then the difference with causal analysis seems to vanish. I shall discuss the two 
horns of the dilemma in this and in the next sections, respectively.  
Consider systemics with its metaphysics first. Causal modelling and systemics 
diverge on some crucial fundamental points. First, causal analysis assumes and 
relies on the distinction between knower and known, while in system analysis the 
observer is part of the system. This marks an important difference between the 
two approaches. As we have seen before, according to von Bertalanffy, the denial 
of the knower-known distinction is a fundamental element of the change of 
worldview. Causal modellers would agree that, especially in social contexts, 
objectivity is more a regulative concept than a target that can be practically 
achieved. No doubt social scientists are driven by their own backgrounds, 
traditions and prejudices when they analyse social phenomena, and this may affect 
the analysis. However, this is to say that the agent interprets the system, not that she 
changes it altogether while she studies it. The claim that the researcher changes the 
system she studies seems to be wrong in almost all social science research 
contexts. How can the social scientist possibly change the system if she is provided 
with observational data that she cannot manipulate in any possible way? Here the 
danger seems to concern whether the interpretation the social scientists provide 
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will meet a (reasonably) good standard of objectivity. Agreed, when the social 
scientist (say, an anthropologist) is involved in field work or when she prepares 
and runs herself interviews, she does interact with the system, but this does not 
imply that that the distinction knower-known ceases to hold. 
Second, causal analysis, unlike systemics, relies on the assumption of the closure 
of the system. Causal analysis isolates a mechanism within a larger context and 
attempts to detect the causal relations that take place therein. The challenge is 
exactly to make a selection among all the elements and relations existing in a given 
context. The selected elements and causal relations will then be exploitable for the 
purposes of explanation, prediction and intervention. The causal modeller cannot 
assume, as the system analyst does, that in a system every element is interrelated 
with any other element. This claim would be useless for explanation (it is a 
trivial—yet true—claim of any complex phenomenon) and for policy (it does not 
provide a criterion to choose which relations to intervene upon). 
Third, in causal analysis mechanisms are established using prior information. 
Background knowledge plays here a fundamental role because it is based on this 
prior and often non mathematised or formalised information that researchers 
formulate the causal structure to test. On the contrary, system analysis is interested 
in the elements of the system and in their reciprocal interrelations abstracting from 
any prior information we might have. The whole context is given once we identify 
the elements and their relations. This is in sharp contraposition with the causal 
modelling practice. Any choice of variables that is independent of the context is 
considered arbitrary and unjustified. Agreed, the prior identification of the context 
would be no guarantee of the objectivity of the research procedures and of the 
results, in the sense that disagreement among different social scientists may 
nevertheless arise. However, the specification of the context justifies the selection 
of variables and relations, not the other way round, as is the case in systemics.  
There are also issues concerning determinism—Bunge says systemics holds 
determinism but not causalism—but I shall leave them aside. The three points just 
discussed, far from being minor differences, seem to make causal analysis and 
system analysis opposite approaches. And yet, the need to combine or integrate 
causal analysis and system analysis comes from different quarters. Here is one 
example. 
Complementarity between the two types of analyses is promoted, for instance, 
by Franck (1994, 2002, 2007). Franck’s motivation is a serious methodological 
difficulty of causal modelling. Often, it is very hard to identify and separate out 
causes and effects. Some cases are of course more difficult than others. For 
biological mechanisms, which are embedded in time, the task is pretty easy: 
smoking at time t causes lung cancer at t’, but not the other way round. However, 
when the temporal order of the variable is not available and/or when causal 
relations make sense in both directions, the task is much harder. For instance, we 
might hypothesise that migration causes marriage dissolution as the former is 
observed before the latter. This causal relation would make sense; however, it 
might be eventually disproved because, say, we overlooked a temporal prior 
process—e.g. marital problems and the subsequent decision to divorce—causing 
migration. To be sure, this is a problem concerning the available data rather than a 
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conceptual problem. But system analysts claim that systemics does not incur into 
such problems because it relies on the separation parts/whole and seeks to identify 
the action of the parts on the whole and on the whole on the parts. This means 
that in a systemic analysis of the fictitious migration-marriage example above 
relations in both directions would be allowed with no apparent contradiction. 
Franck (2002) proposes a general methodology that incorporates both system 
analysis and causal analysis. This methodology proceeds in the following steps 
(Franck 2002, p. 295): 
(1) Beginning with the systematic observation of certain properties of a given social 
system, (2) we infer the formal (conceptual) structure which is implied by those 
properties. (3) This formal structure, in turn, guides our study of the social 
mechanism which generates the observed properties. (4) The mechanism, once 
identified, either confirms the advanced formal structure, or indicates that we need 
to revise it. 
Step (1), in Franck’s proposal, corresponds to the identification of the elements 
and of the environment in Bunge’s methodology. Step (2) is the identification of 
the system within which we model causal mechanisms in steps (3) and (4). Then, steps 
(3) and (4) correspond to causal analysis as presented in sec. 2. This way of 
combining causal analysis and system analysis also finds application, according to 
Franck, in econometrics (see Franck 2007). 
Systemic and causal stories 
But let us compare causal analysis and system analysis using a real case study 
discussed by Michel Loriaux, a demographer that also advocates complementarity 
of the two approaches. Loriaux (1994) denounces a number of theoretical 
weaknesses of causal modelling: the choice of variables and indicators, the 
translation of variables into concepts, and the formulation of causal hypotheses. 
Among the features of causal modelling, Loriaux finds the assumption of the 
closure of the system particularly worrying. Recall, this assumption says that the 
mechanism that has been isolated constitutes a hermetic system which is not 
subject to external influences. This is what allows us to claim that (at least in 
principle) a variable is a cause of another if certain conditions hold, e.g. correlation, 
temporal priority, invariance, etc. This assumption of strict closure is not a realistic 
one, though. The way out is to admit that systems be partially permeable and that 
explicit variables can undergo influences of implicit variables. This is the weak 
closure of the system mentioned in sec. 2.  
However, this isn’t enough. Loriaux takes as an example the causal model 
developed by Lopez-Rios et al. (1992). In this causal model researchers are 
interested in the effects of socio-economic development and of use of sanitary 
infrastructures on regional mortality in Spain. Spain met deep socio-economic 
changes in the mid-Seventies, and consequently policy in that period 
simultaneously tried to intervene to improve the social and economic situation. 
This led to a low mortality rate at the time of the study. It is this background that 
justifies the choice of distinguishing the supply and demand of medical care, unlike 
the majority of similar ecological studies. In fact, previous studies in demography 
and medical geography examined the incidence of the health system on regional 
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mortality coming to the conclusion that regional differences in mortality could not 
possibly be explained by regional differences in the health system. Instead, here 
researchers (successfully) test the causal hypothesis that regional mortality is 
influenced by the health system which is in turn influenced by the social and 
economic development. 
The causal model consists of the following graph and equations. 
 
FIG. 3 Causal graph of  'Health systems and mortality' 
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In this model, each variable is regressed on its immediate ancestors. X1 and X5 
are exogenous, thus meaning that they are the causes of mortality and the other 
variables are intermediate variables, having a causal role just as effects of X1 and 
X5 but not on their own. In plain English, the equations state that regional 
mortality is causally determined by social and economic development; sanitary 
infrastructures alter mortality rate through the use of infrastructures, but the use of 
infrastructures depends on economic development, so it is not an exogenous 
cause; use of sanitary infrastructures, in turn, depends on the age of individuals 
and on ‘sanitary infrastructure’, so again it is not an exogenous cause, but it has 
causal impact on mortality only through other factors. 
The first concern Loriaux has is that the principal variables Lopez-Rios et al. 
use, i.e. economic development, social development and sanitary infrastructure, are 
theoretical abstractions. Surely they correspond to real situations, yet they are 
difficult to grasp. The second concern is that the underlying assumption of this 
causal study is that, according to some economic and sociological theories, 
economic development generates social development. Few people would reject 
this claim, yet such a causal relation is full of other non-explicit assumptions and 
of simplifications that are sometimes hard to justify. Moreover, counterexamples 
exist, as there are situations in which variations in economic development are not 
followed by variations in social development, and even some people would reverse 
the causal arrow. This leads us to two problems. The first is the specification of 
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the direction of the causal relation, but, most importantly, we face the problem of 
specifying the inference process. 
As Loriaux correctly points out, this constitutes a serious setback for the action 
oriented goal of social research. If causes and effects are confused, i.e. they are not 
correctly specified, interventions won’t have the expected impact. That is to say, to 
intervene on an cause which is not in fact a cause, won’t deliver the results planned 
in the policy because causal relations are non-reversible. This is one of the basic 
principles of causal analysis. And if causal analysis cannot fully justify each step of 
the modelling procedure, then it is in serious trouble. The problems raised by the 
closure of the system show, according to Loriaux, that this is more than an 
assumption (to test), this is a postulate. This makes causal analysis too narrow in 
scope, thus overlooking the many interrelations between the elements of the 
system and failing to give the correct complex dynamics of the social system under 
analysis. Causal analysis, he claims, is undermined at the very basis, causal relations 
are chimeras and causal principles lead us to vicious circles. 
Even if we want to dismiss causal analysis on these grounds, the question, 
Loriaux admits, still remains: how can we make sense of statistical covariations 
between variables if we abandon the causal framework? The solution resides in 
system analysis. Loriaux advocates a complementarity between the two frameworks 
rather than a complete replacement. One of the main properties of systems, were 
they social or biological, is of being homeostatic. This is the capability of a system to 
keep itself in a stable state by means of regulatory interdependent mechanisms, in 
spite of disturbing external influences and of the continuous regeneration of its 
components. When internal and external influences become too strong, those 
regulatory and control ‘devices’ can’t keep the previous equilibrium anymore and 
this leads to changes in the system towards new functioning modes and different 
forms of structural organisation. During the processes of balancing, the 
components of the system can jointly evolve and those joint evolutions are exactly 
the covariations we consider to be causal. That is to say, Loriaux suggests that 
causality finds its domain of application within the broader systemic view. 
Fig. 4 is the systemic story Loriaux provides for the same phenomenon Lopez-
Rios et al. (1992) analysed. This graph perhaps gives a more accurate and faithful 
picture of the phenomenon. I am concerned with Loriaux’s methodology, though. 
Is it a quantitative or a qualitative method? It is systemics. Fair enough. Then, what 
are the differential equations that describe this system? How do we decide what 
variables have to be included? What is the theoretical justification of the relations? 
Many boxes contain groups of concepts—how are those conceptual variables 
measured? It is not hard to see that this systemic graph violates the basics rules of 
graphs used in causal modelling. In particular, many relations are double edged and 
there is no causal ordering. But this is a systemic story not a causal one, so fair 
enough. However, how do we set policies at all if all the elements in the system are 
interrelated? These are sensible questions any causalist with an interest in 
methodological issues would ask. I think there is a more serious problem in 
Loriaux’s story, though. Loriaux criticises Lopez-Rios et al.’s causal story on the 
grounds that background knowledge suggests that the picture they provide is 
oversimplified and therefore incorrect. The same background knowledge, instead, 
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suggests a more complex picture—the systemic story given in fig.4. Apparently 
Loriaux is using prior information to figure out what the systemic structure is. 
Thus the context, contrary to Bunge’s methodological precepts, does play a major 
role to determine the structure, be it systemic or causal. It seems to me that not 
only causal analysis and systemic analysis clash too much in their fundamental 
assumptions, but that systemic practice contradicts its theory. 
In sum, my systemic worries can be summarised thus. First, systems become 
very easily intractable and of difficult use for policy, which is nevertheless a major 
goal of causal modelling. Second, no precise and detailed methodology is offered, as 
of today, to analyse data sets. Last (but not least), assumptions clash to much to 
make those approaches compatible.  
5. Systemics: a post hoc comparative tool? 
The discussion above cast doubts on systemics as an analytical tool and somewhat 
excluded that causal analysis could be successfully incorporated into systemics. In 
the following, I will explore the second horn of the dilemma: what happens if we 
buy systemics without the burden of its metaphysics? What role, if any, is then left 
to systemics? 
Let us start from what we have established so far. Systemics is not simply a 
different methodology, it is altogether a different approach to knowledge and 
reality. It is accompanied by a different metaphysics, without which we cannot say, 
strictly speaking, that we make systemic science. The question then arises as to 
whether it is plausible and/or necessary to buy its metaphysics. There are two 
reasons why it is not. The first is that if the goal is to recognise the relative 
character of knowledge and its unavoidable subjective component, then we 
definitively don’t need to: contemporary science is liberated by some Positivistic 
totes. The second is that buying this metaphysics leads to an analysis of a given 
phenomenon that is of difficult use for policy reasons.  
Having given a negative answer to this first question, a second one arises: is it 
possible to make systemic science without its metaphysics? Before giving my two 
cents, I shall consider the answer coming from systemics itself. 
Since the pioneering works of von Bertalanffy, systemics has evolved. System 
science subsequently moved from a hard system thinking, to a soft system thinking, to a 
critical system thinking (see for instance Flood and Jackson (1991)). Whilst the idea 
that system thinking provides an altogether different worldview is still a recurring 
theme, the burden of the systemic metaphysics has been slowly abandoned. In 
critical system thinking, for instance, the observer is not part of the system 
anymore. Witness Checkland (1995, p.100): 
Such thinking starts with an observer/describer of the world outside ourselves who 
for some reason of his own wishes to describe it ‘holistically’, that is to say in terms 
of whole entities linked in hierarchies with other wholes. This leads to the most basic 
prescription of what the observer’s description will contain: the purpose, the 
system(s) selected, and various system properties such as boundaries, inputs and 
outputs, components, structure, the means by which the system retains integrity, and 
the coherency principle which makes it defensible to describe a system as a system. 
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In various books on system science (see for instance Deutsch (1983), Ruberti 
(1984), Mingers (2006), Zgurovsky and Pankratova (2007)) there is no reference to 
the metaphysics that accompanied system thinking of the forefathers, and yet 
systemics is said to have its own specificity and novelty with respect to ‘classical’ 
science.  
I rejoin Ruberti (1984), who in the introduction points out that system thinking 
gave an impetus to new fields of research, especially in differential equations and 
algebra. However, the question is whether this opens a new scientific paradigm, 
and to what extent this paradigm is significantly different from the old one. It 
seems to me that once the metaphysics of hard system thinkers is abandoned, 
system analysis loses its peculiarities, in particular those that supposedly make it a 
new scientific paradigm. Deutsch (1984, p. ix), for instance, claims that 
System analysts are continuously confronted with an apparent dilemma: they are 
expected simultaneously to know something about everything and yet know almost 
everything about something. 
Why is this situation peculiar to system analysts? Don’t causal modellers face the 
same problem? Deutsch does not provide a precise definition of ‘system’ (unlike 
hard system thinkers) but attempts a working definition of ‘system analysis’: on the 
one hand, it is a separation of a whole into its components parts, and, on the other 
hand, it is an examination of a complex structure, of its elements, and of their 
relations. Many of the techniques Deutsch presents to analyse systems are not 
specifically ‘systemic’: loss and risk functions, standard estimation techniques, 
Neyman-Pearson hypothesis testing do not have anything intrinsically ‘systemic’. 
So, where is the specificity and novelty of system science? 
Following up on system methods and applications, Aoki (1984) presents 
dynamic models in economics from a systemic perspective, but eventually his 
‘systemic’ models do not differ from the ‘classical’ models. The only difference is a 
systemic ‘manifesto’ given in the opening of the paper (Aoki 1984, p. 113): 
Broadly speaking, systems science can contribute in two related ways: by providing 
an alternative conceptual framework for dynamic analysis in areas where static or 
comparative static analysis is a dominant mode of analysis and by developing new 
tools to facilitate dynamic or comparative dynamic models. 
Unfortunately, the alternative conceptual framework is not really provided, nor the 
new tools are incompatible with the tools of ‘classical’ science. So where is the 
change of paradigm?  
The new paradigm ought to be accordingly accompanied by a novel 
methodology and possibly with novel theoretical principles guiding applied 
research. This is indeed the goal of Zgurovsky and Pankratova (2007). The 
‘metamethodology’ of systems is concerned with those principles that are valid for 
systems in general, as von Bertalanffy said as early as 1968. In settling down the 
basic principles of system thinking, Zgurovsky and Pankratova (2007, p. 5) say: 
System thinking is a higher form of human cognition such that the processes of 
reflecting objective reality are based on the integrated representation of the studied 
object from the point of view of achieving the research goals, based on knowledge, 
experience, and foresight. 
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Again, why would this be peculiar to systemics? Doesn’t the causal modeller share 
this perspective as well?  
On the one hand, soft and critical system thinking lost what made system 
science significantly different from ‘classical’ science, namely its metaphysics. On 
the other, a detailed systemic methodology to analyse data sets in social science is 
still lacking and when one is offered, it eventually boils down to the known 
methods of ‘classical’ science. The result is a position that claims a difference 
without offering any convincing argument for it. 
Berlinski (1978) even came to attack system science saying that it is a “sham”. 
The reason is this: the gap between its aspirations and its achievements is too large. 
Berlinski’s line of argument is as follows. General system theory aims to provide 
those principles that are applicable to systems in general. This corresponds to 
Zgurovsky and Pankratova’s metamethodology. However, if systems are merely 
described by ordinary differential equations, then those principles will simply 
correspond to the differential equations used in a given field, for instance the 
equation 
dt
dv
mF =  in mechanics, or the law of the logistic curve in the theory of 
biological growth (see Berlinski 1978). But these are empirical laws certainly not 
valid for systems in general. Therefore system theory fails to meet the level of 
generality it aims to. It is worth noting that this general aspect constitutes a major 
goal of system science still nowadays (on this points see Bailey 2001, 2004, 2005). 
Consequently, Berlinski’s criticism is still cogent, some thirty years later. 
Nevertheless, I want to argue that there is still room for systemics, notably as a 
post hoc comparative tool. For a given phenomenon, causal analysis will identify the 
environment (i.e., the causal context, out of background knowledge), the elements 
(i.e., the most relevant variables to include into the causal model), and the structure 
(i.e., how those variables interrelate—the mechanism). This basically corresponds 
to the hypothetico-deductive methodology sketched in section 3. The 
identification and (dis)confirmation of the structure is done within a causal context. 
Background knowledge is essential in a first stage where the context is identified 
and variables are chosen, as well as in a later stage where the structure is tested. It 
is also worth remembering that I pointed out the flexibility of the H-D 
methodology: ‘negative’ results may lead to change the model, to redefine 
conceptual variables, and may also lead to discard background knowledge itself. 
Notice that the order in which environment, elements, and structure are identified 
in the H-D methodology differs from the systemics’ order. There, the elements are 
identified first, then the environment and finally the structure. 
For a given phenomenon, systemic analysis will provide a more detailed picture, 
by suggesting more possible ways in which the elements of the system may 
interrelate. This results from the methodology proper to systemics. In fact, in 
choosing first the elements, the system analyst is not, in principle, limited by the 
context and by the available data. Having virtually more elements to ‘play with’ and 
a concept of system where every element interacts with everything else, the system 
analyst can now envisage a complex structure where as many relations as possible 
take place among the elements previously identified
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Systemics will play the role of a post hoc comparative tool in the following 
sense. The question to be answered will be: is the causal story an adequate 
simplification of the systemic story? The answer to this question will depend, in 
part, on the purpose of the causal analysis, that is explanation, prediction, or 
policy. Also, as a post hoc comparative tool systemics will force causal modellers 
to give stronger theoretical, methodological, and empirical justifications to their 
modelling strategy and results. Loriaux and Franck suggested that a causal analysis 
find its place within system analysis. What I am suggesting, instead, is that once a 
causal analysis is completed, systemics play the role of an additional ‘sounding 
board’. 
Consider again the case study on health system and mortality in Spain discussed 
earlier. The objective of this study, recall, was to provide an explanation of a 
decline in regional mortality rates in the Eighties after socio-economic policies in 
the Seventies. What role would systemics have as a post hoc comparative tool? Let 
us follow systemic methodology.  
 
First: identification of the elements. Lopez-Rios et al. (1992) identified six 
variables (including ‘mortality’ which explicitly plays the role of the effect). Loriaux 
(1994), instead, identified nineteen groups of concepts. We’d then expect the 
causal modeller to provide a sound justification for her choice. For instance, data 
allowed to measure ‘economic development’ but not ‘inequalities between classes’ 
(inégalités entre classes, in Loriaux’s graph). Or, ‘economic development’ conceptually 
corresponds to the two joint boxes up-left in Loriaux’s graph (structure de production 
et développement économique/état de la technique, structure industrielle,…) and is measurable 
with the available data, etc.  
 
Second: identification of the structure. Loriaux complained, for instance, that 
according to well established economic theories ‘economic development’ generates 
‘social development’ but examples where the relation is reversed exist. Here, the 
causal modeller ought to justify the direction of this bit of her mechanism. For 
instance, data allowed time ordering of the variables. Or, the causal modeller could 
invoke background knowledge explaining why in this case the relation goes from 
‘economic development’ to ‘social development’ and not the other way round. A 
reason might be that policies in the Seventies in Spain mainly intervened on 
economic aspects.  
 
Third: identification of the environment. Whilst system analysts get at the 
environment through the identification of the elements and of the structure, causal 
modellers take it as their starting point. It seems to me that concerning this last 
point causal modelling will be the sounding board of system analysis, rather than 
the reverse. The causal modeller has to clearly specify at the beginning of her 
analysis the population of reference and the socio-demo-political context. Will the 
system analyst identify the same population of reference using a priori elements and 
structures? I have already highlighted a tension in the systemic methodology in this 
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respect: how could Loriaux have possibly selected the elements he did without 
using any background knowledge? The system analyst might rebut that what 
Loriaux drew is a general systemic story, not specific to Spain in the mid-Eighties. 
That’s fine, but then the system analyst has to justify why her story is also 
applicable to the Spanish situation under analysis. It is in fact far from being self-
evident that such a general scheme such as fig.4 will automatically be valid in a 
specific case. As is well know to any social scientist, concepts and relations are 
highly context-relative. For instance, maternal education does not play the same 
role for child survival in developing and in developed countries. 
 
Agreed, the use of systemics as a post hoc comparative tool just sketched is, at 
present, just a possibility to integrate two different approaches but never done in 
practice. This might be somewhat idealistic, as it would require involving a system 
scientist in every causal analysis. Idealistic, perhaps, but, to echo Wunsch (2007), as 
desirable as having a philosopher in every research group in science.  
Of course, using system analysis as a post hoc comparative tool leads to 
abandon the strong metaphysical tenets of systemics. In particular, this leads to a 
charitable interpretation of systemics, where ‘system’ is given a weak connotation: 
causal mechanisms are within larger systems, but the postulate that every thing 
interacts with everything else is relaxed. Also, the notion of ‘interaction’ is given a 
weak and diversified interpretation: first, the agent interacts with the system in the 
sense that she interprets it but does not, ipso facto, modify it, and second, 
elements in the system can have mere correlational relations or causal interactions. 
Soft and especially critical system thinkers would possibly not object to this 
move. Yet, this might be perceived as a defeat by hard system theorists seriously 
preaching a new course in science and in philosophy. But perhaps this just 
contributes to putting systemics in (the right) perspective. Herbert Simon, who 
defended and promoted systemics and cybernetics as early as 1969, seemed to 
have a reasonable and moderate view about the pretended change of paradigm. I’ll 
leave Simon (1982 [1969], p. 193) the last word: 
A number of proposals have been advanced in recent years for the development of 
‘general system theory’ that, abstracting from properties peculiar to physical, 
biological, or social systems, would be applicable to all of them. We might feel that, 
while the goal is laudable, systems of such diverse kinds could hardly be expected to 
have any nontrivial properties in common. Metaphor and analogy can be helpful, or 
they can be misleading. All depends on whether the similarities the metaphor 
captures are significant or superficial.  
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FIG. 4 Loriaux's systemic graph 
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